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Veda¯nta as a philosophical school does not appear in sources belonging to traditions
different from itself until late, presumably not before the second half of the first
millennium CE. This point is not, as far as I can see, contested in scholarly
literature.
A different, though related, issue is whether the fundamental text of Veda¯nta
philosophy, the Brahmasūtra, is as old as the Mīmāṃsāsūtra; if so, it was
presumably already in existence centuries before Veda¯nta as a philosophical school
is noticed in philosophical texts of other schools. This is a different issue, because it
is conceivable that the Brahmasūtra existed and was preserved in circles that did not
participate in philosophical confrontations.1 These circles may then have held a
more or less secret doctrine that resembled in certain respects the Veda¯nta
philosophy that was still to be created. On this hypothesis, this doctrine did not wish
to interact with the different philosophical schools, and may have been the isolated
property of certain Brahmanical groups that did not bother, or wish, to systematize
it2 or wish to test its mettle in confrontations with other thinkers.3 All this is
conceivable, but does not affect the observation that philosophical Veda¯nta, i.e.
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1 There is barely a su¯tra in the Brahmasūtra which has no variant readings, and this process of
diversification had already begun before S´an˙kara; see Bapat (2011: xxvii f).
2 Cf. Aklujkar (2001): 461: “Strictly speaking, Bhartr
˙
hari is not a Veda¯ntin … It would be more accurate
to speak of Bhartr
˙
hari as a Trayyanta-vedin, a term having a close connection with Veda¯ntin but coming
from a period in which Vedānta was not a system or school.” (my emphasis, JB).
3 Aklujkar (2011: 850 f). draws attention to the expressions pratisaṃkhyānirodha, apratisaṃkhyānirodha
and kṣaṇikatva in the Brahmasūtra. These are Buddhist terms, but not only that. They are terms that
belong to the Abhidharma developments of north-western India that are associated with the
Sarva¯stiva¯dins: pratisaṃkhyānirodha and apratisaṃkhyānirodha are two of their asaṃskṛta dharmas,
and momentariness (kṣaṇikatva) is a doctrine they introduced (see Bronkhorst 2009: 82 ff., 93). These
developments in Abhidharma date already to a time preceding the Common Era. The presence of these
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systematized Veda¯nta, did not appear in the court of debating and comparing
philosophers until roughly the second half of the first millennium CE.
Much more weighty is the claim that Mīmāṃsāsūtra and Brahmasūtra were
originally parts of one single work. It would suggest that the followers of the
Mīmāṃsāsūtra were also followers of the Brahmasūtra, at least during the early
period. In other words, there was a time when ritual Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sakas were Veda¯ntins
and vice versa.
In an earlier publication (2007) I have argued that Mīmāṃsāsūtra and
Brahmasūtra were not originally parts of one single work. This position has now
been criticized by Aklujkar (2011). The present article will consider some of his
arguments.4
Note to begin with that we have no direct early evidence for the existence of a
combined Mīmāṃsā- + Brahma-sūtra. Our primary sources of information are
commentaries and independent works, mainly of Veda¯nta allegiance, and all
dating from the time after the appearance of Veda¯nta as a philosophical school.
Most of these texts look upon Veda¯nta as a form of Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sa¯, so their authors
were a priori inclined to look upon the Brahmasūtra as a Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sa¯ text. The need
to justify their Veda¯nta as being on a par with traditional Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sa¯ must have
made it attractive to believe that the Brahmasūtra once was part of a single work
which also contained the Mīmāṃsāsūtra. And yet this is not what we find in all
the relevant sources.
As a first approximation, we may think that a single work has a single author. As
a matter of fact, Sures´vara, presumably a direct pupil of S´an˙kara, thought that
Mīmāṃsāsūtra and Brahmasūtra did indeed have a single author. To cite Aklujkar
(p. 829), “one just cannot doubt that Sures´vara thought of Jaimini as involved in the
composition of both the su¯tra groups, one beginning with athāto dharma-jijñāsā [i.
e., what we now call the Mīmāṃsāsūtra, JB] and the other with athāto brahma-
jijñāsā [the Brahmasūtra, JB]”. Aklujkar rejects attempts “to undermine Sures´vara’s
credibility”, and clearly considers Sures´vara’s testimony reliable.5
However, the Prapañcahṛdaya, a text of uncertain date,6 contains a passage that
speaks of a Mīmāṃsāśāstra consisting of twenty adhyāyas. Aklujkar accepts “the
fact that the passage mentions Jaimini as the author of the first sixteen adhya¯yas and
Vya¯sa … as the author of the remaining four adhya¯yas” (p. 828). He then asks:
“Could the absence of associating Jaimini with the last four adhya¯yas and the
absence of associating (Ba¯dara¯yan
˙
a) Vya¯sa with the first sixteen adhya¯yas not be
based … on the information the Prapan˜ca-hr
˙
daya author had about the primary
authors of the particular parts?” This appears to mean that the different parts of this
Footnote 3 continued
terms in the Brahmasūtra tells us therefore little about its date, but it does suggest that the text belonged
to a less isolated milieu than one might think.
4 Aklujkar’s critiques are “largely … philological in nature, based as they are on actual textual evidence”
(p. 879). This means that he overlooks Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sa¯’s self-understanding, which is yet a vital issue in this
discussion, as will be shown below.
5 On p. 878 Aklujkar states that Sures´vara “must have known that Ba¯dara¯yan
˙
a authored the
[Brahmasūtra]”. More on this below.
6 See Bronkhorst (2007: 20 n. 27, 64 n. 98).
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presumably single text had different primary authors. Put differently, two parts,
composed by two different authors, had been put together. Or more straightforward:
two texts, composed by two different authors, had been combined. If the
Prapañcahṛdaya is right, these two parts subsequently became parts of one single
text. The Prapañcahṛdaya provides no information as to when this supposedly
happened. It leaves all options open, such as: the two texts were composed more or
less simultaneously and joined soon after; or they were composed simultaneously
but joined much later; or they were not composed simultaneously at all and were
joined some time after the composition of the more recent one of the two. In spite of
this, Aklujkar asks: “Is there any word in [the] statement [of the Prapan˜ca-hr
˙
daya
author] that conveys the idea of ‘combining’ or ‘efforts at combining’?” The answer
to this question is, of course, that there is not just a word that conveys this idea, but
that the whole statement does so.
Like the Prapañcahṛdaya, Padmapa¯da, presumably another pupil of S´an˙kara,
appears to distinguish between the author of the Mīmāṃsāsūtra, Jaimini, and the
author of the Brahmasūtra, here called Ba¯dara¯yan
˙
a. Aklujkar comments (p. 833): “I
fail to see how Bronkhorst can be certain that Padma-pa¯da disagrees with Sures´vara
on the matter of authorship of the [Brahmasūtra].” Unfortunately, in philology one
is rarely certain, if ever. One makes the best of sometimes difficult and ambiguous
statements, knowing that even simple statements may allow of multiple interpre-
tations. One is guided by the knowledge that some interpretations are closer to the
text than others. However, the difficulties that habitually harass the philologist are
almost completely absent in Padmapa¯da’s passage. It reads, in Aklujkar’s
translation (p. 833):
Revered Jaimini affirmed dharma only as the object of his reasoned
exploration. He applied himself to that domain (of dharma) only. He did
not seek to determine where and how the (aforementioned) knowing (or
attainment) of own nature (exists/comes about), for (such a determination) had
no use (for him, that is, in the domain he chose for his reasoned exploration).
On the other hand, revered Ba¯dara¯yan
˙
a, having announced his intention to
accomplish (pratijñāya) a separate reasoned exploration, carried out that
exploration with the s´a¯stra consisting of reconciling (the statements in the
Veda or Veda-conclusion texts).7
At first sight we find here the same division we also found in the Prapañcahṛdaya.
Two authors are involved: Jaimini, presumably as author of the Mīmāṃsāsūtra, and
Ba¯dara¯yan
˙
a, as author of the Brahmasūtra.
Aklujkar does not like this straightforward interpretation, nor indeed the glaring
opposition between Prapañcahṛdaya and Padmapa¯da on one hand, and Sures´vara on
the other. In order to resolve it, he states that “we should note that in making such a
statement, Padma-pa¯da is not saying that Jaimini had no hand in shaping the
7 Pañcapādikā of Padmapa¯da, ed. S. S´rı¯ra¯ma S´a¯strı¯ & S. R. Krishnamurthi S´a¯strı¯, pp. 149–150: sa ca
svarūpāvagamaḥ kasmin kathaṃ veti dharmamātravicāraṃ pratijñāya tatraiva prayatamānena bhagavatā
jaimininā na mīmāṃsitam upayogābhāvāt, bhagavāṃs tu punar bādarāyaṇaḥ pṛthakvicāraṃ pratijñāya
vyacīcarat samanvayalakṣaṇena.
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S´a¯rı¯raka, that is, the [Brahmasūtra]”. Indeed, Aklujkar proposes to look upon all
three texts as providing reliable information, by making the assumption that Jaimini,
while being the primary author of the Mīmāṃsāsūtra, helped Vya¯sa Ba¯dara¯yan
˙
a in
composing the Brahmasūtra. He can therefore state that “there is a consistent record
in our … sources … to the effect that the [Mīmāṃsāsūtra] and [Brahmasūtra] are to
be treated as one would treat two volumes of a connected text, ascribed, as volumes,
to two different authors” (p. 846). In other words, two authors composed two texts
(but not without helping each other), that were to be incorporated in one single work
that they had planned together.8 These two authors worked simultaneously.9 Indeed,
“If [the] attempt to disprove the traditional assumption of the contemporaneity of
Jaimini and Vya¯sa/Ba¯dara¯yan
˙
a is considered successful, the possibility that
[Mīmāṃsāsūtra] and [Brahmasūtra] were planned as a continuum must be
discarded” (p. 861).10 Aklujkar does not consider this attempt successful. In his
opinion, the single work of which Mīmāṃsāsūtra and Brahmasūtra were once parts,
was the result of joint authorship (pp. 887–889).
Clearly Aklujkar weaves an elaborate speculative network with the purpose of
eliminating a rather obvious contradiction in the three texts considered. What is his
evidence? None whatsoever, except possibly “the fact that Jaimini and Ba¯dara¯yan
˙
a
quote each other” (p. 861). Given the fact that the three texts ascribe the authorship
of the Brahmasūtra to three different authors—Jaimini, Ba¯dara¯yan
˙
a and Vya¯sa—(or
at least give different names to its author) reduces the value of this evidence
practically to naught.
I am confident that many philologists, like me, will shudder when confronted
with the speculative reconstruction of the lives and joint activities of persons—
Jaimini and Ba¯dara¯yan
˙
a—on the basis of so little evidence. This reconstruction is
yet necessary to maintain Aklujkar’s main thesis, viz., that Mīmāṃsāsūtra and
Brahmasūtra were originally part of a single text. If we do not accept this
reconstruction, the thesis collapses. As Aklujkar puts it (see above): “If [the] attempt
to disprove the traditional assumption of the contemporaneity of Jaimini and Vya¯sa/
Ba¯dara¯yan
˙
a is considered successful, the possibility that [Mīmāṃsāsūtra] and
[Brahmasūtra] were planned as a continuum must be discarded” (p. 861). It looks
indeed wise to discard it.
Quite apart from what Aklujkar may think of it, the passages so far considered
represent two different positions. According to Sures´vara, Mīmāṃsāsūtra and
Brahmasūtra were originally part of one single work, with one single author;
according to Padmapa¯da and the Prapañcahṛdaya, the two had two different
authors, and were originally therefore not part of one work. In the latter case, these
8 P. 877: “Where I … go beyond [Parpola] is that I hold that the text pair was planned to form a unity”.
9 In a more recent article Aklujkar (2013) goes even further, claiming that the team consisted not of just
two, but of three authors: Jaimini the author of the Mīmāṃsāsūtra, Ba¯dara¯yan
˙
a the author of the
Brahmasūtra, and Ka¯s´akr
˙
tsna the author of the Saṅkarṣakāṇḍa that is/was situated between the former
two texts.
10 Also p. 878: “I have strong reservations about accepting the conclusion that Ba¯dara¯yan
˙
a is later than
Jaimini”.
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two works may have been combined at some point in time, but our passages do not
tell us when this happened (if it happened at all).
With this in mind, and remembering the difficulties of interpretation that meet
philological work at every step, we may consider the passage in S´an˙kara’s
Brahmasūtrabhāṣya that Aklujkar discusses in detail. The passage is obscure and
lends itself to different interpretations. Earlier scholars—to begin with Jacobi—
interpreted it in a manner that presupposed that, in S´an˙kara’s opinion,Mīmāṃsāsūtra
and Brahmasūtrawere one single text. Other scholars, from Keith onward, demurred,
and my own publication (2007: 6 ff.) shows that the passage allows of a satisfactory
interpretation that is not based on that presupposition. Aklujkar criticizes this
interpretation, but does in the end nomore than stating that an interpretation is possible
in which Jacobi’s presupposition is maintained. This, of course, is nothing new.
Aklujkar’s discussion of this and related matters is marred by a fundamental
misunderstanding of what Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sa¯ is.11 This comes out clearly in the following
passage (p. 845):
It should be amply clear … that there was really no adequate justification for
Bronkhorst’s attempt to show how Veda¯nta joined hands with Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sa¯ at a
later time—how there were first non-Mı¯ma¯m
˙
saka Veda¯ntins and later …
Mı¯ma¯m
˙
saka Veda¯ntins. The forced nature of the attempt becomes further
evident even if we ask only the following question: Why would the specified
thinkers try to move near ritual Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sa¯ when they were not all that
enthusiastic about ritual and had inherited a long tradition of seeing only a
limited utility in ritual and of interpreting ritual metaphorically …
What then is Bronkhorst’s justification even for speaking of later Veda¯ntins as
anxious to be seen, additionally, as Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sakas or as well-versed in
Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sa¯? It may be located in his statement on p. 23: “… at least some
Veda¯ntins at some point … made a[n] effort to turn themselves into, or
become recognized as, some kind of Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sakas, different from the ritual
Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sakas … because these Veda¯ntins, too, followed the same strict rules
of Vedic interpretation as the ritual Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sakas.”
Aklujkar’s confusion is partly due to the unfortunate expression “ritual Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sa¯”
(which I use, too). It suggests that Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sakas were interested in ritual. Strictly
speaking, and seen from their own theoretical perspective, they were not. Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sa-
kas studied the eternal Veda, using refined tools of interpretation, and it turned out that
the Veda told them to perform rituals. At least theoretically, their ritual activities were
not the result of their interest in ritual, but the outcome of their study of the infallible
Veda. Had their interpretational efforts convinced them that theVeda told them to play
tennis,12 they would then have played tennis, whether they liked it or not.
11 Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sa¯ clearly presents great difficulties of understanding for modern scholars. For a discussion of
another misunderstanding, see Bronkhorst (1998).
12 Those who find this possibility farfetched may recall that Dharmakı¯rti proposes to interpret the
injunction agnihotraṃ juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ as “One should eat dog meat” (Eltschinger et al. 2012: 24,
41).
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The Veda¯ntic Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sakas, such as S´an˙kara, pointed out that the correct and
consistent application of the Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sa¯ principles of interpretation did not only
reveal the obligation to sacrifice. It also revealed knowledge of Brahma as means of
liberation. Theoretically, the Veda¯ntic Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sakas were no more interested in
Brahma than the “ritual” Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sakas were interested in ritual. In both cases they
did no more than interpreting the Veda correctly. Both were Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sakas, with the
proviso that the Veda¯ntins concerned considered themselves even better Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sa-
kas than the others, because they applied the same principles in a more thorough
manner. The question “Why would Veda¯ntins try to move near ritual Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sa¯
when they were not all that enthusiastic about ritual?” betrays in this manner a
fundamental misunderstanding and misappreciation of Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sa¯. No one—not
even the “ritual Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sakas”—was enthusiastic about ritual, at least in theory.
And the Veda¯ntins concerned were not interested in ritual, but all the more in
showing that their position was based on the correct interpretation of the Veda, i.e.,
with the help of the principles elaborated by “ritual” Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sa¯.
It should now be clear that certain Veda¯ntins were keen to be considered
Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sakas, interpreters of the Veda who derive their positions directly from the
Veda rather than speculators about the absolute. Aklujkar is therefore right in stating
that “there is a consistent record in our … sources … to the effect that the
[Mīmāṃsāsūtra] and [Brahmasūtra] are to be treated as one would treat two
volumes of a connected text” (p. 846). The advantage of this position for Veda¯nta
thinkers is obvious: their position is as close to the Veda, if not more so, than that of
the traditional Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sakas.
What can we conclude from this short discussion? First of all, that there is no
compelling evidence to show that Mīmāṃsāsūtra and Brahmasūtra were originally
part of one single text. Second, the wish of certain Veda¯ntins to be looked upon as
serious Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sakas rather than as idle speculators makes sense (and is confirmed
by textual evidence discussed in my 2007 article). The claim by certain Veda¯ntins
that the Brahmasūtra was originally part of a larger text that also included the
Mīmāṃsāsūtra is therefore understandable. It is even possible that Mīmāṃsāsūtra
and Brahmasūtra were actually joined by some (with the Saṅkarṣakāṇḍa in
between), and that commentaries were written on the whole. This does not however
mean that this represented the original situation, with the implication that from the
beginning Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sakas were, in their heart of hearts, Veda¯ntins by conviction. This
notion should be abandoned, because it merely adds confusion to our understanding
of the history of Indian thought.
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